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In this work, linear (linearized) cyber-physical systems with output feedback control, 
whose sensors are experiencing faults or are under cyber-attack, are studied. Two 
different cases are investigated. First, when all sensors are attacked, then, when some 
sensors are protected from the attacks. Finite time convergent observers, specifically 
the sliding mode ones, including the observers with gain adaptation, are employed for 
on-line reconstruction of the cyber-attacks. The corrupted measured outputs are 
“cleaned” from cyber-attacks, and feedback control that uses the “cleaned” outputs is 
shown to provide elevated cyber-physical system performance close to the one 
without attack. Finally, the proposed methodology is applied to an electric power 
system under cyber-attack. Simulation results illustrate the efficacy of the proposed 
observers. 
Keywords: Cyber-physical systems, Finite Time Convergent (Sliding mode) observer, 
Adaptive sliding mode observer 






Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) are the integration of the cyber-world of computing 
and communications with the physical world. In many systems, control of a physical 
plant is integrated with a wireless communication network, for example transportation 
networks, electric power generation and distribution networks, integrated biological 
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Since CPSs use open computation and communication platform architectures, they 
are vulnerable to suffering adversarial physical faults or cyber-attacks. Faults and 
cyber-attacks are referred to as attacks throughout the paper. We have to 
acknowledge that cyber-attacks are relatively new phenomena that cause systems 
faults. Recent real-world cyber-attacks, including multiple power blackouts in Brazil 
[4], the StuxNet attack [5] in 2010 and the Maroochy water bleach in 2000 [6], 
showed the importance of providing security to CPSs. It is suggested in [7] that 
information security mechanisms have to be complemented by specially designed 
resilient control systems. In the other words, information security techniques [8] may 
be not sufficient for protecting systems from sophisticated cyber-attacks. 
Controlling systems with measurement sensors and actuators, which are 
hijacked/corrupted remotely or physically by the attackers is challenging. The use of 
novel control/observation algorithms is proposed in this paper for recovering CPS 
performance on-line if an attacker penetrates the information security mechanisms.  
Cyber security of CPS must provide three main security goals: availability, 
confidentiality, and integrity [8]. This means that the CPS is to be accessible and 
usable upon demand, the information has to be kept secret from unauthorized users, 
and the trustworthiness of data has to be guaranteed. Lack of availability, 
confidentiality, and integrity yields denial of service, disclosure, and deception 
respectively. A specific kind of deception attack called a replay attack has been 
investigated when the system model is unknown to the attackers but they have access 
to the all sensors [9-10].  Replay attacks are carried out by “hijacking” the sensors, 
recording the readings for a certain time, and repeating such readings while injecting 
them as exogenous signal into the system’s sensors. In the case when the system’s 
dynamic model is known to the attacker, another kind of deception attack, called 
covert attack, has been studied in [11], and the proposed algorithm allows cancelling 
out the effect of this attack on the system dynamics. In systems with unstable modes, 
false data injection attacks are applied to make some unstable modes unobservable 
[12]. Denial of service attacks assaults data availability through blocking information 
flows between different components of the CPS. The attacker can jam the 
communication channels, modify devices and prevent them from sending data, violate 
the routing protocols, etc. [13]. In a stealth attack, the attacker modifies some sensor 
readings by physically tampering with the individual meters or by getting access to 
some communication channels [14]. As a result, detecting and isolating cyber-attacks 
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in CPSs has received immense attention [15], and there is a significant amount of 
publications, which have focused on keeping the system safe from attacks. However, 
how to ensure the CPS control system can continue functioning properly if the cyber-
attack has happened is another serious problem that should be investigated.   
To increase the robustness of CPS to sensor attacks, a lot of effort has been applied 
to counteract the attacks via developing sophisticated software [16-17]. However, if 
despite this an attack still happens, they must be detected, isolated, and, if possible, 
reconstructed and compensated. Therefore, beside prompt detection, on-line attack 
reconstruction is crucial for guaranteeing continuity of service of CPS, often 
supporting critical infrastructures. Thus, both on-line detection and reconstruction of 
attacks on SPC with a consequent compensation are of prime interest in terms of CPS 
research. 
In [18], new adaptive control architectures that can foil malicious sensor and 
actuator attacks are developed without reconstructing the attacks, by means of 
feedback control only. Another approach to protect CPS from attack using on-line 
attack reconstruction/estimation techniques is proposed in [19], [20]. A sparse 
recovery algorithm is applied to reconstruct cyber-attacks in [20]. Sparse recovery 
algorithms are effective when only limited number of sensors is under attacks. In 
[19], a finite time convergent higher order sliding mode (HOSM) observer based on a 
HOSM differentiator and a sparse recovery algorithm are used to reconstruct on-line 
the cyber-attack in a nonlinear system.  
Detection and observation of a scalar attack by a sliding mode observer (SMO) has 
been accomplished for a linearized differential-algebraic model of an electric power 
network when plant and sensor attacks do not occur simultaneously [21].  
A probabilistic risk mitigation model for cyber-attacks against Phasor 
Measurement Unit (PMU) networks is presented in [22], where a risk-mitigation 
technique determines whether a certain PMU should be kept connected to the network 
or removed, while minimizing the maximum threat level for all connected PMUs. In 
[23] the sliding mode-based observation algorithm is used to reconstruct the attacks 
asymptotically. This reconstruction is approximate only, since pseudo-inverse 
techniques are used.  
In this paper, linear/linearized CPSs controlled by output feedback subject to 
sensor attacks are considered. The corrupted/attacked measurements propagate the 
attack signals to the CPS through the feedback controllers causing CPS performance 
degradation. Two CPS configurations are studied: a scenario when all sensors are 
4 
 
prone to get attacked and a scenario when some sensors are protected from the 
attacks. 
The main challenge that is addressed in the paper is on-line exact reconstruction of 
the sensor attacks with an application to an electric power network. 
The contributions of this are as follows  
 Two CPS scenarios are investigated: all sensors are prone to attack; and 
some sensors are protected from the attack. 
 Fixed-gain and adaptive-gain SMOs are proposed for the on-line 
reconstruction of sensor attacks. Specially, dynamic filters that address the 
attack propagation dynamics are proposed and employed for attack 
reconstruction for the first time. 
 The measurements corrupted by the attacks are “cleaned” on-line in order 
to stop the sensor attack propagation to the CPS through output feedback 
control. After a finite time transient, needed for the attack reconstruction 
the CPS closed loop performance results as attack free performance. 
 The proposed methodology is applied to an electric power network, whose 
sensors are under attack. Simulation results illustrate the efficacy of the 
proposed observers. 
 
2. System Dynamics 
Consider a completely observable and controllable LTI system (Fig. 1), whose 
measured output is corrupted by an attack. 
 
Fig. 1. The closed-loop dynamical system in the presence of sensor attacks 





      (1) 
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where the triplet  , ,A B C  is completely controllable and observable, nx   
denotes the states, qu  is a control signal, and 
py  represents the measured 
output. The ( ) md t   is the smooth norm-bounded sensor attack signal that is to be 
reconstructed on-line.  
The following assumption is made: 
(A1): the Kimura-Davidson condition [24]  
1l p n        (2) 
holds. 
Assuming assumption A1 holds then there exists a static output feedback control  
u Ky       (3) 
where 
l pK   is a gain matrix, that stabilizes the system (1).  
Substituting (3) into (1) results in the closed loop system 




    (4) 





      (5) 
where A A BKC   is Hurwitz, and B BKD  . 
Again, note that ( )d d t  is a bounded, smooth sensor cyber-attack signal.  
Discussion: Assume that the sensor attacks are reconstructed, i.e. ˆ( ) ( )d t d t  as 
time increases. Then the polluted measurement y Cx Dd   can be “cleaned” as 
ˆ
cleany y Dd  , and 0cleany y   as time increases, where y Cx  is a measured 
output in the absence of attack. Therefore, substituting y Cx  for y Cx Dd   in (3) 
we obtain 
x Ax Bd x Ax
y Cx Dd y Cx
   
 
   
    (6) 
In the other words, the compensated dynamics of the output feedback control system 
(1), whose sensors are under attack, will converge to the stable system (6) with the 
desired asymptotic dynamics that are not affected by the sensor attack signals. The 
problem of the output feedback controller (3) design is out of the scope of this work. 
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Therefore, the main problem addressed in this paper is on-line reconstruction of the 
sensor attack signal ( )d t  in system (5) with application to an electrical power system 
network shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Sensor Attack Analyzer 
3. Problem formulation 
 
The problem is to protect system (1) from the norm-bounded smooth sensor 
attack ( )
md t  , with 1 2 1 2( ) , ( ) , , 0d t L d t L L L    by  
(a) reconstructing on-line the sensor attack ( )d t , so that the estimate 
ˆ( ) ( )d t d t       (7) 
as time increases, and  
(b) “cleaning up” the measurement: ˆcleany y Dd   to compensate the effects 
of the sensor attack on the system closed-loop performance 
 
4. Sensor attack On-line Reconstruction 
 
Firstly, a case when the number of sensors and the number of attacks is the same (
p m ) is studied, and two different scenarios are investigated: 
(a) all sensors can be attacked,  
(b) k  sensors ( k p ) are protected from the attacks. 
Then, the case when the number of sensors is greater than the number of attacks (
p m ) is studied: 




4.1. All sensors can be attacked 
Since the system (5) is completely controllable and observable, it can be partitioned 
as 
1 11 12 1 1
2 21 22 2 2
1 1 2 2
x A A x B
d
x A A x B
y C x C x Dd
       
        
       
  
   (8) 
where 
( )
1 2 1 2 2, , , , , ,det( ) 0
n p p p n p p p p mp m x x C C D C           . 
Firstly, the closed-loop system (5) is transformed to a form convenient for the 
observer design. Specifically, the state variable 2
px   is replaced by the output 
variable py . This is 
1 21 1 22 23
11 1 12 13
x G x G y G d
y G x G y G d Dd
  
   
    (9) 
where  
1 1
11 1 11 1 12 2 1 2 21 2 22 2 1
1 1
12 1 12 2 2 22 2
1 1
13 1 12 2 1 1 2 22 2 2 2
1




23 12 2 1
G C A C A C C C A C A C C
G C A C C A C
G C A C D C B C A C D C B
G A A C C
G A C







   
 




  (10) 
An observer is designed mimicking system (9) 




x G x G y
y G x G y 
 
  
     (11) 
where p  is the injection term. The estimation errors are introduced 
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ,y xe y y e x x        (12) 
The following assumptions are made concerning matrices in (9) and (10): 
(A2): The matrix 21G  is Hurwitz. 
(A3): The entries of the matrix transfer function  
1
11 21 23 13G sI G G G Ds

    have 
numerators with the roots located in the left hand side of the complex plane (a 
minimum phase case). Here s  is the Laplace variable.  
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(A4): For the term 
111 12 13x y
G e G e G d Dd      the following inequality holds at 
least locally:  
11 12 131
1 2 3x yG e G e G D
L L L L L L L L L         (13) 
where 
11 12 13 1 1
11 12 13, , , , , ,x yG G G D x e y eG L G L G L D L e L e L        
11 12 131
1 2 3, , , , , , , , 0x yG e G e G DL L L L L L L L L  . 
4.1.1 Sensor attack reconstruction via fixed-gain SMO  
The first main result is formulated in the following Theorem: 
Theorem 1: Consider the system in (9) and (10) with the observer (11), whose 
injection term   is designed in a unit vector format  






         (14) 
that makes the observer (11) and (14) the SMO. Assume that the assumptions A1-A4 
hold. 




11 21 23 13
ˆ
eqd G sI G G G Ds 


      (15) 
where eq  is the equivalent injection function, 0ye   in finite time, and 
ˆ( ) ( )d t d t  as time increases in the sliding mode.  
The proof of the Theorem 1 is presented in Appendix. 
Remark 1: Given equivalent control eq , the attack estimate in (15), where the 
dynamic filter appears naturally, is exact. 
Remark 2: Although the equivalent control eq  was conceived as an abstraction to 
allow the analysis of the reduced order sliding motion, a close approximation can be 
obtained in real-time by low-pass filtering of the switching signal (14) [25]. 








           (16) 
where 0   is a (small) time constant, then 
( )eq eq         (17) 
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Therefore, the eq  estimation error in (17) is small, for a small enough choice of τ 
[26].  




11 21 23 13 eqd G sI G G G Ds 


      (18) 
and the attack estimation error after a transient is over can be computed 









          (20) 
Note that the low pass filter in (16) is the simplest choice, but other higher order 
systems with low-pass characteristics can be employed.  




11 21 23 13G sI G G G Ds


    of the estimator (15) are the regular ones. This fact 
is demonstrated in the case study. It means that the SMC injection term   in (14) can 
be used in (15) instead of eq , bearing in mind that eq  is recovered/estimated 
approximately via the low pass filtering of   that takes place while   is processed 
by the proper transfer function   
1
1
11 21 23 13G sI G G G Ds


   . 
4.1.2 Sensor attack reconstruction via adaptive-gain SMO 
In subsection 4.1.1 it was assumed that the perturbations term   is locally norm-
bounded as in (13), and the boundary 3 0L   is known. In many practical cases this 
bound is unknown, and the gain of the sliding mode injection term (14) in the fixed 
gain SMO in (15) can be overestimated. This gain overestimation could increase 
chattering that is difficult to attenuate. 
In this section an adaptive-gain SMO is considered for the cyber-attack on-line 
reconstruction. The following assumption is made: 
Assumption (A5): The disturbance term   satisfies the conditions 
3 4, ,L L        (21) 
where 3 4, 0L L   exist but are unknown. 
10 
 
The dual layer nested adaptive SMO [27] is used for designing the injection term 
  in (13). In accordance with the dual layer nested adaptive sliding mode 
observation algorithm [27] the constant gain 3L  in the injection term (14) is to be 
replaced by the adaptive gain ( )L t  (without ( )L t  overestimation). This is 






         (22) 
Following the dual layer nested sliding mode observation adaptive algorithm in [27] 
applied to the unit-vector injection term in (14), an error signal is defined as 
1
( ) ( ) ( )eqt L t t  

       (23) 
where the scalars 0 1  , 0  , and eq  represents a low-pass filtered estimate of 
eq  obtained as 
eq eq         (24) 
The task of selecting 0   is discussed in Remark 2. 
The adaptation dynamics of ( )L t  in (22) are defined as [27] 
( ) ( ) ( ( ))L t r t sign t    (25) 
where ( ) 0r t   is a time-varying scalar that is supposed to supersede the upper-
bound of the rate of change of the generalized attack, 4L  , by some finite time. 
In this paper it is assumed that ( )r t  has the structure  
0( ) ( )r t t      (26) 
where 0  is a fixed positive scalar. The evolution of ( )t  is chosen to satisfy an 
adaptive law [27] 






    
 

    (27) 
where 0, 0    are design scalars. 
The second main result is summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: Consider the system in (9) and (10), and assume that the assumptions 
A1 – A5, hold. A SMO is designed as in (11) with the adaptive injection term in (22)-












   
 
    (28) 
for any given 0  in (27), 4L  in (21), 1q  , and, 0 1  , then  
 the injection term (22) exploiting the dual layer adaptive scheme given by (23)-(27), 
drives ( )t  to a domain ( ) 2t   in finite time and consequently ensures a 
sliding motion 0ye   can be reached in finite time and sustained thereafter. 
Furthermore, the gains ( )r t and ( )L t  remain bounded; 
 the sensor attack signal ( )d t  is reconstructed in the sliding mode as time increases as 
in (15) with the equivalent adaptive injection term eq  or eq . 
The proof of the Proposition 1 is presented in the Appendix. 
Remark 4: The proposed unit vector injection gain-adaptation algorithm in (22)-
(27) does not require the knowledge of the boundaries 3 4, 0L L  . 
4.2 k  sensors ( ,k p p m  ) are protected from the attacks 
Again consider the system (5), whose sensors are under the attacks.  
Assumption (A6): k  out of p  sensors are protected, and the remaining p k  
sensors might be attacked/corrupted.  
Separating the protected and unprotected measurements, system (5) can be 
partitioned as  
1 11 12 13 1 1
2 21 22 23 2 2




232 21 22 1
3
0
x A A A x B
x A A A x B d




Cy C C D
x
       
       
 
       
              
 
     
      
       
   (29) 
where 
   
 
1 2 1 2
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 2 3 1 2 3
1
, , , ,
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
T
T T k p k
T
T T T n p k p k
T n p p p k pT T T k p
p k p
y y y y y
x x x x x x x




   
 
   
 
    
 






It is assumed that  
Assumption (A7): The square matrices  12
k kC   and ( ) ( )23
p k p kC    are non-
singular. 
Next, the partitioned system (29), (30) is transformed to a convenient for the 
Lyapunov analysis form. Specifically, the state variables 2
kx   and 3
p kx   are 
replaced by the output variables 1
ky   and 2
p ky  . This is: 
1 11 1 12 1 13 2 14
1 21 1 22 1 23 2 24
2 31 1 32 1 33 2 34 1
x Q x Q y Q y Q d
y Q x Q y Q y Q d
y Q x Q y Q y Q d D d
   
   
    
   (31) 
where 
   
   
11 11 12 11 13 21
12 12 12 13 22
13 12 13 13 23
14 12 14 13 24 1
21 11 11 12 21 13 31
11 12 12 22 13 32 11 11 13 12 23 13 33 21
22 11 12 12 22 13 32 12 11 13 12 23 13 33 22 ,
Q A A h A h
Q A h A h
Q A h A h
Q A h A h B
Q C A C A C A
C A C A C A h C A C A C A h







     
     
   
   
   
23 11 12 12 22 13 32 13 11 13 12 23 13 33 23
24 11 1 12 2 13 3
31 21 11 22 21 23 31
21 12 22 22 23 32 11 21 13 22 23 23 33 21




C A C A C A h C A C A C A h
Q C B C B C B
Q C A C A C A
C A C A C A h C A C A C A h
Q C A C A C A h C A C A C A h
Q
     
  
  
     
     
    21 12 22 22 23 32 13 21 13 22 23 23 33 23
34 21 1 22 2 23 3
,C A C A C A h C A C A C A h
Q C B C B C B










   
1
1 1 1 1
11 12 13 23 22 12 11 13 23 21
1
1 1 1
12 12 13 23 22 12
1
1 1 1 1
13 12 13 23 22 12 13 23
1
1 1 1 1
14 12 13 23 22 12 13 23 1
1
1 1 1 1
21 23 22 12 13 23 21 22 12 11
22
h I C C C C C C C C C
h I C C C C C
h I C C C C C C C
h I C C C C C C C D
h I C C C C C C C C C
h





   

   

   









1 1 1 1
23 22 12 13 23 22 12
1
1 1 1
23 23 22 12 13 23
1
1 1 1
24 23 22 12 13 23 1
I C C C C C C C
h I C C C C C
h I C C C C C D









  (33) 
The main results relating to sensor attack reconstruction in systems with  
,k p p m   sensors protected from the attacks are presented in the following 
Theorem. 
Theorem 2: Consider system in (31)-(33), and assume that assumption A7 holds. The 
proposed SMO is given by 
1 11 1 12 1 13 2
1 21 1 22 1 23 2 1
2 31 1 32 1 33 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
x Q x Q y Q y
y Q x Q y Q y




   
   
    (34) 
where 1
k   and 2























     (35) 
with 1 2 11 12, , , 0L L    and  
1 1 21 1 1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,x y ye x x e y y e y y         (36) 
then the sensor cyber-attack is exactly estimated as 
 
   
1


















    
    




in the sliding mode rt t   where rt t  is sliding mode reaching time, and 
1 2




21 11 14 24
1
31 11 14 34 1
p p
Q sI Q Q Q






    
 is 





21 11 14 24 11 12
1
21 2231 11 14 34 1
Q sI Q Q Q H H
H HQ sI Q Q Q D sI


    
    
      
   (38) 
while the matrices 11
k kH  , ( )12 ,
k p kH    ( )21
p k kH   , ( ) ( )22
p k p kH    . 
The proof of the Theorem 2 is presented in Appendix. 
Remark 5: The injection terms 1 2,   in (35) can be also designed in the dual layer 
adaptive form as shown in section IV. Note that the problem of estimating 1 2,eq eq   
used in (37) is discussed in Remark 2. 









 in (37) requires inversion of the 
matrices (that represent the dynamic filters) of smaller dimensions rather than in (15) 
due the fact that k p  sensors are protected from the cyber-attacks. 
 
4.3 All sensors p m  can be attacked.  
Since p m , the system (5) can be partitioned using a nonsingular 
transformation 
m mM   
y My       (39) 
that is selected so that 
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p m mC C   are partitions of 1C M C . 
Remark 7. In (41) the virtual measurements 1 2,y y  are available, and 1y  can be 
interpreted as a virtual sensor measurement protected from cyber-attacks. 
After further state vector partitioning, system (41) may be presented in a (29) 
format. Then the algorithms presented in Sub-section 4.2 can be employed for 
reconstructing the cyber-attack ( )d t  in system (5) in the case p m . 
 
5. Case study: Sensor attacks On-line Reconstruction in Electrical Power Network 
5.1. Mathematical model of electrical power network 
The descriptor (Differential Algebraic Equations (DAE)) swing mathematical 
model is used to describe the electromechanical behavior of an electric power 
network [28, 29].  
The linearized DAE swing mathematical model for an electrical power network 
stabilized by a linear output feedback controller is given by [29]: 
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 
  (42) 
where 
T
T T Tx    
 
 is the vector of states of the system, 
, ,a a b     are vectors of the phase angles of the source measured in rad, 
generator speed deviations from synchronous measured in rad s , and of bus angles 
measured in rad respectively. The index a  is the number of generators, and b  is the 
number of buses in the electrical system. The vector 
py   is the measurement 
vector, the vector md   is the sensor attack vector, and 
(2 ) ,a b m p mB D     
are the attack distribution matrices; ,P P   are known inputs, corresponding to 
mechanical torque and power demand. The matrices ,
a a
g gE M
  are diagonal 
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matrices whose nonzero entries consist of the damping coefficients and the normalized 
inertias of the generators respectively. Finally, the matrices , , , ,, , ,g g g l l g l lL L L L
   
 form 
the following symmetric susceptance matrix 
, ,
, ,
g g g l










     (43) 
that is the Laplacian associated with the susceptance-weighted graph. 
Assumption (A8) The matrix ,l lL

 is nonsingular (such an assumption usually holds 
in practical electric power systems). 
Note that the terms that appear in the electric power network model (42) 
0 0
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     (44) 
are due to the output feedback control that processes the output ( )y Cx Dd t   
corrupted by the cyber-attack signal ( )d t . 
5.2. Transformation of DAE (42) to ODE 
 Assuming (A8) holds, the variable   can be expressed as 
   
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Substituting (45) into (42) we obtain 
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where 
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5.3. System (46), (47) Parameterization 
The electrical power system considered in this paper is a classical nine-bus 
configuration adopted from [29]. It consists of 3 generators  1 2 3, ,g g g  and 6 load 
buses  1 6,...,b b  as presented in Fig. 3 [29]. 
 
Fig. 3. The Western Electricity Coordinating Council power system [29] 
Consider that the measurements of the system (46) are 3 , i.e. 
3 30,C D C D I             (48) 
and 
3 6 3, 0B I B          (49) 
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 
  (50) 
where   31 2 3
T
     ,   31 2 3
T
     , 6  , 
  31 2 3
T
y y y y  , and   31 2 3
T
d d d d   is the sensor cyber-attack 
signal. Matrices gM  and gE  are the diagonal matrices of the generator inertial and 
damping coefficients 
0.125 0 0 0.125 0 0
0 0.034 0 , 0 0.068 0
0 0 0.016 0 0 0.048
g gM E
   
   
 
   
      
  (51) 
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The Laplacian matrix associated with the susceptibility-weighted graph is the 
symmetric susceptibility matrix 9 9L   given by  
0.058 0 0 0.058 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.063 0 0 0.063 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.059 0 0 0.059 0 0 0
0.058 0 0 0.235 0 0 0.085 0.092 0
0 0.063 0 0 0.296 0 0.161 0 0.072
0 0 0.059 0 0 0.330 0 0.170 0.
0 0 0 0.085 0.161 0 0.246 0
0 0 0 0.092 0 0.170 0 0.262





























  (52) 
The system (50) is reduced to 
1( , ) ( )
( )












    (53) 







0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0.3145 0.1187 0.1158 1 0 0 1.0559
0.4363 0.8474 0.4111 0 2 0 14.5564
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(54) 
In order to apply the sensor attack reconstruction algorithms proposed in sub-sections 
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y d t
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  

     
  (55) 
where ( , )    is presented in a linearized form as 
1 2 2( , ) ( )y d t                (56) 
5.4.  The observer design: all sensors may be under attack ( 3p m  ) 
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Note that in this case, no sensors have been protected, and all sensors might be 
attacked, therefore the number of sensors under attack could be zero, one, two, or 
three. It is not known ahead of time if any particular sensor is attacked. 
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     (57) 
where   is the injection term designed in a format of (14).  












     
 
    (58) 
Remark 8: The matrix 
1 3 31







    
 
 is invertible. 
Note that the problem of estimating eq  used in (58) is discussed in Remarks 2 
and 3. 
5.5.  The SMO design: the first sensor is protected ( 1k  ) 
Consider the case when the first sensor, is protected from the attack, in other words 
2 3( ) 0
T
Dd t d d          (59) 
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     (60) 
To apply the sensor attack reconstruction algorithms proposed in the sub-section 4.2 
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where   is the injection term.  
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Remark 9: The matrix  
1 2 21









     
 
is invertible. 
Apparently, the invertibility condition presented here is easier to verify than the one 
in the Remark 7 due to the reduced order of the matrix to be inverted.  
Note that the problem of estimating 2 3,eq eq   used in (63) and (64) is discussed 
in Remarks 1 and 2. 
5.6.  Cleaning up the measurements corrupted by the sensor cyber-attacks 
As soon as the sensor attacks are exactly reconstructed in (58) or (63), the 
measurement vector ( )y d t   is to be “cleaned up” from the attack signal as
ˆ( )cy y d t  . The “cleaned” system (53) becomes  
 
 
1 ˆ( , ) ( ) ( )
ˆ( ) ( )
c c
c c c g
c c
P M d t d t
y d t d t
 
 






   

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   (65) 
where , ,c c cy   are the states of the system and the output of the system after 
















      (66) 
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as soon as ˆ( ) ( )d t d t . 
5.7. Simulation Results 
Simulation set-up: The simulation results have been obtained via MATLAB. 
Three simulation experiments have been performed using the Electrical Power 
Network model in (50).  
Experiment 1 No sensor attacks are assumed, i. e. ( ) 0d t  . 
Experiment 2 It is assumed that the attacker has access to the actual measurement 
vector  1 2 3, ,
TTy    , then the cyber-attack named stealth attack [14] that 
















      (67) 
Experiment 3 The sensor stealth attacks are reconstructed on-line and the 
measurements are “cleaned up.”  
The results of the simulations are presented in Figs. 4-14. In this case study, the 
attack observations are done by both the fixed-gain sliding mode observer and the 
adaptive sliding mode observer presented in Section 4.  
Experiments 1: The plot presented in Fig. 4 demonstrates the stabilization of 
the outputs (generator speed deviations from synchronous measured in rad s ) at zero 
as expected.  
Experiments 2: Figure 5 demonstrates the dynamics of the measured outputs 
while the sensors are under stealth attacks (67). The effects of the stealth attack are 
observed. 
Experiment3: Figure 6 shows the compensated outputs, when the attacks are 
reconstructed and cleaned from measurements. The cleaned output dynamics 
practically coincide with the outputs of the systems without attack after a short 
transient. In Figs. 7-9, the outputs of system in the three scenario which are without 




Fig. 4. Outputs of the system (50) without attacks 
It is shown in Figs. 10-12 that sensor attacks 1 2 3, ,d d d  are accurately estimated by 
1 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,d d d . The attack observation is done by both the sliding mode observer and the 
adaptive sliding mode observer presented in Section 4. Figs. 13, 14 show the sliding 
mode injection terms used in both observers. The output stabilization plots under both 
observers look the same. However, the main advantage of the adaptive sliding mode 




Fig. 5. Outputs of the system (50) under attack 
 
Fig. 6. Compensated outputs of the system (50) as obtained in (65) after the corrupted 




Fig. 7. Comparing 1y  without attack, corrupted 1y , and compensated 1y after being attacked 
 





Fig. 9. Comparing 2y  without attack, corrupted 2y , and compensated 2y after being attacked 
 
 




Fig. 11. Comparing sensor attacks 2d  and it's reconstruction 2d̂  
 
 




Fig. 13. Sliding mode injection terms 1 2 3, ,    
 
Fig. 14. Adaptive sliding mode injection terms 1 2 3, ,    
6. Conclusion 
In this work, linear (linearized) cyber-physical systems under output feedback 
control, whose sensors are experiencing faults or are under cyber-attack, are 
investigated. Specifically, the sensor attacks are reconstructed on-line. Two different 
conditions are considered. Firstly, all of the sensors are prone to get attacked. 
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Secondly, some of sensors are protected from attacks. Finite time convergent sliding 
mode observers, including observers with gain adaptation, are proposed for on-line 
reconstruction of the sensor attacks. The dynamic filters that address the attack 
propagation dynamics are proposed and employed for the attack reconstruction for the 
first time. As soon as the attacks are reconstructed, the corrupted measurements are 
cleaned from attacks, and the feedback control that uses the cleaned 
measurements/outputs provides the cyber-physical system performance close to the 
one without attack. Simulation results of a real electrical power network with sensors 
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and, taking into account the assumption (A4), the derivative of the Lyapunov function 
candidate (A.2) is estimated   
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Therefore, 0ye   in finite time at least locally. The estimation error dynamics (A.1) 
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Transforming (A.5) by taking Laplace transform and solving for d , we obtain 
the estimate d̂  given by (15) The theorem is proven. 
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the ye  dynamics from second equation of (A.1) 
)A.6(   
111 12 13y x y
e G e G e G d Dd      
with bounded perturbation term  
)A.7(   
111 12 13 3x y
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e need to prove that the adaptive injection Firstly, w .3Lat least locally with unknown 
in finite time. The proof of the finite time  0ye ) drives 27(-)22in ( term 
follows the one ) 27(-)22in ( by the adaptive injection term  0ye convergence 
in finite time yields  0ye 186]. Convergence -, pp. 18527ion 2 in [of the Proposit
is reconstructed as in (15) with the adaptive  ( )d t) and then (15). Therefore, A.5( 
.. The proposition is proveneqor  eqnjection term i 
Proof of Theorem 2: Taking into account (31), (34), and (36), the estimation error 
dynamics are derived as  
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that is applied to the second equation in (A.8) in order to prove the convergence 
1
0ye   in finite time. 
The derivative of the Lyapunov function (A.9) can be computed as 
 
1 1 1 1 1 21 21 22 23 24 1
T T
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Denoting 
1 1 21 21 22 23 24x y y
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and assuming 1 11L   at least locally, where 11 0L   is known, we obtain 
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that is applied to the third equation in (A.8) in order to prove the convergence 
2
0ye   in finite time. Denoting  
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and assuming 2 12L   at least locally it is easy to show that 2 0ye   in finite time 
2
0rt   at least locally by means of the unit vector injection term 2  in (35). The 
proof is similar to the one that proves 
1
0ye   in finite-time by means of the unit-
vector injection term 1  in (35). 
Then, the estimation error dynamics (A.8) in the sliding mode 
1 2
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is achieved in finite time  
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where 1eq  and 2eq  are the equivalent injection signals. 
Transforming (A.15) using Laplace, and excluding 
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